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Abstract—We propose a new secure transmission scheme in
the multi-input multi-output multi-eavesdropper wiretap channel.
In this channel, the NA-antenna transmitter adopts transmit
antenna selection (TAS) to choose the antenna that maximizes
the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver to
transmit, while the NB-antenna receiver and the NE-antenna
eavesdropper adopt maximal-ratio combining (MRC) to combine
the received signals. We focus on the practical scenario where
the channel state information (CSI) during the TAS process is
outdated. In this scenario, we propose a new transmission scheme
to prevent the detrimental effect of the outdated CSI on the
wiretap codes design at the transmitter. To thoroughly assess
the secrecy performance achieved by the proposed scheme, we
derive new closed-form expressions for the exact secrecy outage
probability and the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity for
arbitrary SNRs. We also derive new compact expressions for the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability at high SNRs. Notably,
in the analysis we take spatial correlation at the receiver into
consideration. Apart from the advantage of our scheme over
the conventional TAS/MRC scheme, we demonstrate that the
outdated TAS reduces the secrecy diversity order from NANB
to NB . We also demonstrate that antenna correlation improves
the secrecy performance at low SNR but deteriorates the secrecy
performance at medium and high SNRs, by affecting the secrecy
array gain only.
Index Terms—Secure transmission, outdated antenna selection,
exponential antenna correlation, MIMOME wiretap channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE BROADCAST nature of wireless communicationmakes it inherently vulnerable to potential eavesdropping
by unauthorized receivers. As such, the need of confidential
and secure transmission poses significant challenges in design-
ing wireless communication systems. Traditionally, the confi-
dentiality of data transmission has been addressed at higher
layers using cryptographic protocols. However, these methods
may not be suitable for large scale dynamic wireless networks,
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due to the high computational complexity caused by key
distribution and management [1, 2]. Against this background,
some efforts have been devoted to information-theoretic se-
crecy and revealed the possibility of ensuring confidentiality
by exploiting the inherent randomness of physical channels in
single-antenna wiretap channels, multi-antenna channels, and
relay-aided channels (see [3–11] and the references therein).
In particular, if the eavesdropper’s observation is a degraded
version of the legitimate user’s observation, it is possible
to provide secure communications between the legitimate
users while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant of
secure messages. Motivated by these studies, the physical layer
security techniques are explored to offer an additional level of
protection and to achieve perfect secrecy. The core philosophy
of physical layer security is to exploit the characteristics of
the wireless medium, such as fading, rather than applying the
conventional cryptographic methods.
A. Related Work
Motivated by the potential of using multiple antennas in
next generation wireless standards, physical layer security in
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels has
recently attracted a tremendous amount of research efforts.
From the information-theoretic perspective, the secrecy ca-
pacity has been examined in multi-input, single-output, multi-
eavesdropper (MISOME) channels [12] and multi-input, multi-
output, multi-eavesdropper (MIMOME) channels [13]. In [12,
13] we note that the assumption that the perfect channel state
information (CSI) of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel is available at the transmitter may not be realistic.
Particularly, the eavesdropper’s CSI is difficult to obtain at
the transmitter if the eavesdropper is a passive entity. Against
this background, recent works designed secure transmission
schemes for the realistic passive eavesdropping scenario [14–
19]. In [14, 15], transmit beamforming in the direction of
the legitimate receiver was recognized as an useful means to
enhance security in MIMO wiretap channels.
It is mentioned that transmit beamforming requires high
feedback overhead and high computational cost of signal
processing, especially when the number of transmit antennas
is large. As such, a low-cost and low-complexity alternative,
referred to as transmit antenna selection (TAS), was proposed
to capture the advantages of MIMO systems in security
enhancement. In [16], TAS was introduced into the multi-
input, single-output, single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) channels
to boost physical layer security. In [17, 18], TAS was ex-
amined in MIMOME channels, together with maximal-ratio
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combining (MRC) and generalized selection combining at
the legitimate receiver. Moreover, [19] proposed a new TAS
scheme which selects two transmit antennas to examine the
trade-off between feedback overhead and secrecy performance
in MIMOME wiretap channels.
B. Motivation
We note that the application of TAS may pose a challenge.
In practice, the signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) of all branches
need to be known for optimal antenna selection. However,
it is indeed challenging to know these SNRs when there is
only one radio frequency (RF) chain at the transmitter [20].
One solution to address this challenge is to use a training
signal in a preamble of transmitted data packets [21]. During
this preamble, the transmitter scans the transmit antennas
to sequentially transmit pilot symbols. After performing the
channel estimation based on the pilot symbols, the receiver
determines the optimal transmit antenna with the maximum
output SNR. Then the receiver uses a feedback link to inform
the transmitter which transmit antenna is selected for data
transmission.
It is worth noting that the pilot symbols in the afore-
mentioned TAS scheme can be several milliseconds apart
[22]. This leads to the fact that the CSI associated with the
selected transmit antenna during the antenna selection process
may not be the same as the CSI during the subsequent data
transmission. Particularly, the CSI at different antennas during
the antenna selection process may be outdated by different
amounts [23, 24]. For example, the estimated CSI for the
preceding antenna is probably more outdated than that for
the subsequent antenna. Since outdated CSI leads to outdated
antenna selection at the transmitter, some publications have
examined its impact on the performance of MIMO systems
without considering secrecy, e.g., [25–27].
When TAS is used for security enhancement, outdated an-
tenna selection introduces a new set of problems. One problem
is that the conventional TAS scheme uses outdated CSI to
construct wiretap codes, which in turns leads to a connection
outage such that the transmitter transmits but the receiver
cannot decode the message. Needless to say, such an outage is
detrimental to the throughput performance. Motivated by this,
in this work we propose a new secure transmission scheme to
avoid the occurrence of the connection outage in the presence
of outdated antenna selection.
C. Novelties
In this paper, we consider that TAS/MRC is used in MI-
MOME channels where TAS is adopted at the NA-antenna
transmitter while MRC is adopted at the NB-antenna receiver
and the NE-antenna eavesdropper. In such channels, we focus
on the practical scenario with outdated antenna selection at the
transmitter and exponential antenna correlation existing among
NB antennas at the receiver. The novelties of our work are
summarized as follows:
1) We design a new secure transmission scheme in the
presence of outdated TAS where the optimal transmit
antenna at the selection time instant t may not be
the optimal one at the secure transmission time instant
t +  . The outdated TAS leads to the fact that the
instantaneous CSI associated with the optimal transmit
antenna obtained at time instant t may not be the same
as that at time instant t+ . Our newly designed scheme
requires the receiver to feed back the index of the op-
timal transmit antenna and the associated instantaneous
CSI in different time slots. This ensures that the perfect
instantaneous CSI associated with the selected transmit
antenna is used for secure transmission, which in turns
guarantees that the connection outage does not occur in
the main channel.
2) We derive new statistics of bivariate generalized hyper-
exponential distributions. This statistics allows us to
precisely analyze the impact of exponential antenna
correlation at the legitimate receiver on the secrecy
performance. We note that the newly derived statistics
have never been presented in the literature. We also
note that they can serve as a powerful tool to examine
the system performance in similar applications, e.g., ex-
ponentially correlated MIMO Rayleigh fading channels
with outdated CSI.
3) We derive new closed-form expressions for the se-
crecy outage probability and the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity. These expressions offer us valuable
insights into the joint impact of outdated antenna selec-
tion and exponential antenna correlation on the secrecy
performance. To the best of our knowledge, these results
have never been reported before. Moreover, we derive
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in order to
examine the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy
array gain at high SNRs. Furthermore, we highlight that
the generality of our results lies in the fact that two
special cases can be examined based on our results:
1. Outdated antenna selection only and 2. Exponential
antenna correlation only.
Our results show that in low SNR regime, higher antenna
correlation brings about a better secrecy performance, whereas
in medium and high SNR regime, higher antenna correlation
leads to a worse secrecy performance. These observations are
due to the impact of antenna correlation on the secrecy array
gain. Our results also show that the outdated antenna selection
imposes a detrimental impact on the secrecy performance
across the whole range of SNR. This impact is due to the
fact that the outdated antenna selection reduces the secrecy
diversity order from NANB to NB . Moreover, our results
show that the secrecy performance improvement provided by
TAS becomes less profound when the selected antenna is more
outdated. We further find that this improvement is almost not
affected by the antenna correlation. In addition, we examine
the impact of Eve’s location on the secrecy performance.
Notation: Uppercase and lowercase bold symbols denote
matrices and vectors, and italic symbols denote scalar vari-
ables. For a complex vector x, kxk denotes the Euclidean norm
and (x)H denotes the conjugate transpose. The mm identity
matrix is denoted by Im, and the expectation is denoted by
E [].
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II. A NEW TRANSMISSION SCHEME WITH OUTDATED TAS
We consider a MIMOME wiretap channel, where the trans-
mitter Alice, the receiver Bob, and the eavesdropper Eve
are equipped with NA, NB , and NE antennas, respectively.
We assume that Eve is a passive eavesdropper such that the
instantaneous CSI between Alice and Eve is not available at
Alice and Bob. The channel between Alice and Bob is referred
to as the main channel and the channel between Alice and
Eve is referred to as the eavesdropper’s channel. We assume
independent but non-identical distributions between the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel such that they have
different average SNRs. We also assume spatial correlation
among the NB antennas at Bob. In practise, spatial correlation
among antennas arises due to the increase in the number
of antennas and the reduction of inter-element spacing. We
further assume no spatial correlation among the NE antennas
at Eve.
In the MIMOME wiretap channel, we consider that TAS
is adopted at Alice to perform secure transmission. We focus
on the practical scenario where the CSI associated with the
selected antenna during the antenna selection process may
be outdated for the subsequent data transmission. Outdated
CSI is often caused by the long processing time and the long
feedback propagation time between Alice and Bob during the
TAS process. As such, outdated CSI leads to outdated antenna
selection at the transmitter. We note that in the conventional
TAS scheme for secure transmission, the CSI associated with
the selected antenna is directly fed back from Bob to Alice
during TAS process for wiretap codes construction [17–19].
Therefore, if the conventional TAS scheme is used for secure
transmission in the presence of outdated antenna selection, a
connection outage may occur in the main channel such that
the transmitter transmits but the receiver cannot decode the
message. In order to avoid this outage, we propose a new
secure transmission scheme to guarantee that the perfect CSI
is used for secure transmission. We next detail the frame
structure and signaling procedures of our scheme as follows.
A. A New Secure Transmission Scheme
1) TAS Process: TAS is conducted based on the transmis-
sion and reception of the pilot sequences from P1 to PNA ,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The signaling procedure of the TAS
process is performed via the operations from E1 to ENA+1,
as illustrated in Fig. 2. We next detail the steps of TAS.
1) Since there is only a RF chain at Alice, Alice transmits
pilot sequences Pk, 1  k  NA, from each transmit
antenna at different time slots, starting with the trans-
mission of P1 from the first transmit antenna and ending
with the transmission of PNA from the NA-th transmit
antenna.
2) With the aid of the pilot sequences, Bob estimates the
channel vector between each transmit antenna and NB
receive antennas. As per the rule of TAS/MRC, Bob
selects the optimal transmit antenna that maximizes the
instantaneous SNR of the main channel.
… …
Fig. 1. The frame structure of TAS and secure transmission.
Alice sends pilot sequence
Alice sends pilot sequence
Alice sends pilot sequence
Bob feeds back the best antenna index
Alice sends pilot sequence          using the best antenna
…
 
……
Bob feeds back the perfect main channel gain
Alice starts secure transmissions
Fig. 2. Signaling procedure of TAS and secure transmission.
3) Bob feeds back the index of the optimal transmit an-
tenna, k, to Alice, which is determined as
k = argmax
1kNA
1=2hk;B ; (1)
where  denotes the NBNB antenna correlation ma-
trix at Bob and hk;B denotes the NB1 channel vector
between the kth transmit antenna and NB antennas at
Bob.
2) Secure Transmission: To perform secure transmission
with the optimal transmit antenna k, Alice is required to
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obtain the accurate instantaneous CSI of the main channel
to facilitate the design of wiretap codes in the passive eaves-
dropping scenario. We note that it is not wise for Alice to
use the instantaneous CSI associated with the kth transmit
antenna during the TAS process to design wiretap codes since
this CSI may be outdated due to the time delay of TAS.
If Alice uses this CSI, Bob may not be able to decode the
secure messages sent by Alice. Therefore, prior to secure
data transmission, another pilot sequence PNA+1 is transmitted
from the kth transmit antenna at Alice to Bob for accurate
channel estimation, as depicted in Fig. 1. The steps of secure
transmission through the operations from ENA+2 to ENA+4,
as depicted in Fig. 2, are explained as follows.
1) Alice transmits the pilot sequence PNA+1 from the k
th
transmit antenna that allows Bob to accurately estimate
the channel vector between the kth transmit antenna
and NB receive antennas.
2) With the aid of PNA+1, Bob accurately estimates the
channel vector between the kth transmit antenna and
NB receive antennas. Then Bob feeds back the instan-
taneous CSI of the main channel to Alice.
3) Alice encodes information messages into codewords
using the instantaneous CSI fed back by Bob.
There are two feedback operations in our proposed trans-
mission scheme, i.e., the optimal antenna index in time slot
ENA+1 and the accurate instantaneous CSI associated with
the selected transmit antenna in time slot ENA+3. We find
that this feedback design is different from the conventional
TAS scheme which feeds back the optimal antenna index
and the CSI associated with the selected transmit antenna
together. Therefore, our newly designed transmission scheme
only incurs an additional time slot as the added overhead but
no extra information bit. The additional time slot guarantees
that our proposed TAS scheme avoids using the outdated CSI.
B. Channel Knowledge with Outdated TAS
After the operations from E1 to ENA+4, Alice performs
secure transmission using the kth transmit antenna. The
received signal vector at Bob is written as
y =
q
d AB
1=2~hk;Bx+ nB ; (2)
where ~hk;B denotes the d time-delayed version of hk;B , nB
denotes the NB  1 additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
vector at Bob satisfying E

nBn
H
B

=INB
2
B , and 
2
B denotes
the noise variance at each receive antenna of Bob. Moreover,
we incorporate the path loss between Alice and Bob in (2)
where dAB is the distance between Alice and Bob and  is
the path-loss exponent. Using a generalization of outdated CSI
model, known as a Gauss-Markov process [29], we formulate
the relationship between ~hk;B and hk;B as
~hk;B = dhk;B +
q
1  2deB; (3)
where eB is a random vector, the entries of which are i.i.d.
zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables. In (3), the
degree of “outdated CSI” is captured using d, the correlation
coefficient between the CSI used for antenna selection and the
CSI used for wiretap codes construction. In the literature, d
is generally expressed using the Jake’s autocorrelation model,
given by d = J0 (2fdd), where J0 () is the zeroth-order
Bessel function of the first kind and fd is the maximum
Doppler frequency.
Bob applies MRC to process the received signal using a
MRC weight wB = 1=2~hHk;B
.1=2~hk;B . As such, the
received signal at Bob after MRC is expressed as
y =
q
d AB
1=2~hk;Bx+wBnB: (4)
Based on (4), the instantaneous SNR of the main channel is
written as
~B =
1=2~hk;B2 Pd AB=2B ; (5)
where P is the transmit power.
Since Alice has no knowledge about the eavesdropper’s
channel, we consider the worst-case scenario where perfect
channel estimation is performed by Eve and no correlation
exists among NE antennas. Therefore, the received signal
vector at Eve is given by
z =
q
d AEhk;Ex+ nE ; (6)
where hk;E denotes the NE  1 channel vector between
the k transmit antenna at Alice and NE antennas at Eve,
nE denotes the NE  1 AWGN vector at Eve satisfying
E

nEn
H
E

= INE
2
E and 
2
E denotes the noise variance at
each receive antenna of Eve. Similar to (2), we incorporate
the path loss between Alice and Eve into (6) where dAE is
the distance between Alice and Eve and  is the path-loss
exponent. In this worst-case scenario, Eve performs MRC to
combine the received signals in order to maximize the prob-
ability of successful eavesdropping. Using the MRC weight
given by wE = hHk;E
.
khk;Ek , the received signal symbol
at Eve after MRC is expressed as
z =
q
d AE khk;Ekx+wEnE : (7)
Based on (7), the instantaneous SNR of the eavesdropper’s
channel is written as
E = khk;Ek 2 Pd AE=2E : (8)
C. Wiretap Codes Design
Since Bob feeds back the instantaneous CSI to Alice prior
to secure data transmission, Alice knows the instantaneous
capacity of the main channel given by ~CB = log2 (1 + ~B).
Then Alice uses ~CB to construct wiretap codes such that Bob
is always able to decode the transmitted signals. In the passive
eavesdropping scenario, Alice does not have the knowledge
of the instantaneous capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel
given by CE = log2 (1 + E). Therefore, Alice assumes
the instantaneous capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel as
C^E = ~CB Rs to perform secure data transmission [6], where
Rs is a constant secrecy rate selected by Alice. Then Alice
constructs the wiretap codes using ~CB and C^E . If C^E  CE ,
the codewords guarantee perfect secrecy. If C^E < CE , Eve
can eavesdrop on the transmitted data and the secrecy is
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compromised. This mandates the use of the secrecy outage
probability as a useful and well-accepted secrecy performance
metric.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, we evaluate the secrecy performance of
the TAS system with outdated antenna selection at Alice
and exponential antenna correlation at Bob. In particular,
we first focus on the exponential antenna correlation model
and derive the joint statistics of bivariate generalized hyper-
exponential distributions. We then derive new closed-form
expressions for the exact cumulative density functions (CDFs)
and probability density functions (PDFs) of ~B and E . Based
on these results, we analyze the exact and asymptotic secrecy
performance of outdated antenna selection with exponential
antenna correlation in MIMOME wiretap channels. In addi-
tion, valuable insights are gained to examine the individual
impact of outdated antenna selection and exponential antenna
correlation on the secrecy performance.
A. Statistics of ~B and E
To commence our derivation of the statistical prop-
erties of ~B , we first examine the CDFs and the
PDFs of k =
1=2hk;B2 Pd AB=2B and B =1=2hk;B2 Pd AB=2B . We adopt the exponential correla-
tion model since it is widely used to describe the scenario
where multichannel reception is conducted over equal-spaced
diversity antennas [30, 31]. The correlation matrix of this
model is  =
h

ji jj
a
i
, where a 2 (0; 1) denotes the degree
of correlation between antennas. In this case, the PDF of k
is obtained as [32, Eq. (11)]
fk () =
NBX
u=1
u
'uB
exp

  
'uB

; (9)
where B = Pd
 
AB=
2
B , '1; '2;    ; 'NB denotes the distinct
real eigenvalues of  and
u = '
NB 1
u
NBY
k=1;k 6=u
('u   'k) 1: (10)
Based on (10), it is easy to find that u is a real number
which satisfies
PNB
u=1 u = 1. As such, we treat k as
a generalized hyper-exponential-distributed random variable
(RV). Using Fk () =
R 
0
fk () d, the CDF of k is
obtained as
Fk () = 1 
NBX
u=1
u exp

  
'uB

: (11)
Based on (5), we express ~k =
1=2~hk;B2 Pd AB=2B
as the time-delayed version of k. Since ~hk;B has the same
distribution as hk;B , ~k is also a generalized hyper-exponential
distributed RV. We next derive the joint statistics of the
bivariate generalized hyper-exponential distributions in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1: The joint pdf of ~k and k with correlation
parameter d is derived as
f~k;k (x; y)
=
NBX
u=1
u
2
u
1  2d
exp

 u (x+ y)
1  2d

I0

2ud
p
xy
1  2d

; (12)
where u = ('uB)
 1 and I0 () denotes the zeroth-order
modified Bessel function of the first kind.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
Using the CDF and the PDF of k, the PDF of B is written
as
fB () = NA [Fk ()]
NA 1 fk () : (13)
Based on the knowledge of probability theory, we formulate
f~B (x) as
f~B (x) =
Z 1
0
f~B jB (x jy )fB (y) dy; (14)
where
f~B jB (x jy ) =
f~k;k (x; y)
fk (y)
: (15)
We next present the PDF of ~B in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The PDF of ~B is derived as
f~B (x) =NA
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n

( 1)n n!
X
PNB
i=1 ki=n

 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1
i
2
i
i + (1  2d)
PNB
l=1 kll
 exp
0@ 

i +
PNB
l=1 kll

ix
i + (1  2d)
PNB
l=1 kll
1A ; (16)
where ki, i = 1;    ; NB are nonnegative integers.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
Using F~B (x) =
R x
0
f~B (y) dy, the CDF of ~B is obtained
as
F~B (x) =1 NA
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n

( 1)n
X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
 n!
 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1
ii
i +
PNB
l=1 kll
 exp
0@ 

i +
PNB
l=1 kll

ix
i + (1  2d)
PNB
l=1 kll
1A : (17)
We next present the PDF of E . It is worthwhile to note
that the preselected transmit antenna at Alice corresponds to a
random transmit antenna for Eve since it is entirely determined
by the CSI of the main channel [16]. As such, we express the
PDF of E as [18]
fE (x) =
xNE 1
  (NE) 
NE
E
exp

  x
E

; (18)
where E = Pd
 
AE=
2
E is the average SNR of the eavesdrop-
per’s channel.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 6
B. Secrecy Performance
1) Exact Secrecy Performance: The secrecy outage proba-
bility is defined as the probability that the achievable secrecy
rate is less than a predetermined secrecy transmission rate
Rs, below which the secure transmission is not guaranteed.
According to this definition, we formulate the secrecy outage
probability as Pout (Rs) = Pr fCs < Rsg, where Cs =
max
n
~CB   CE ; 0
o
.
We find that two outage events occur when Cs < Rs. The
first outage event is that Alice does not transmit. This event
occurs when ~CB  Rs. The second outage event is that Alice
transmits but the message is decodable at Eve and thus secrecy
is compromised. This event occurs when ~CB > Rs and Cs <
Rs. Therefore, the secrecy outage probability is expressed as
Pout (Rs) =Pr
n
~CB < Rs
o
| {z }
1
+ Pr
n
Cs < Rs
 ~CB > RsoPrn ~CB > Rso| {z }
2
;
(19)
where 1 characterizes the probability of the first outage event
and 2 characterizes the probability of the second outage
event. Based on the probability theory, we simplify (19) as
Pout (Rs) =
Z 1
0
fE (E)F~B
 
2Rs (1 + E)  1

dE :
(20)
Substituting (17) and (18) into (20) and solving the resul-
tant integrals with the aid of [33, Eq. (3.381.1)], we derive
Pout (Rs) as
Pout (Rs) =1 NA
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n
 X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
n!
 ( 1)n
 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1
ii
i +
PNB
l=1 kll
 exp   #  2Rs 1  1 + #2RsE NE ; (21)
where # =

i+
PNB
l=1 kll

i
i+(1 2d)
PNB
l=1 kll
.
We highlight that (21) is derived in closed form and applies
to the realistic scenario with exponential correlation at NB
antennas and outdated antenna selection in the main channel.
We next use (21) to evaluate the probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
is defined as the probability that the achievable secrecy rate
is positive. According to this definition, we formulate it as
Pr fCs > 0g = 1  Pout (Rs)jRs=0. Utilizing (21), we derive
Pr fCs > 0g as
Pr fCs > 0g =NA
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n
 X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
( 1)n
 n!
 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1
ii
i +
PNB
l=1 kll
(1 + #E)
 NE :
(22)
2) Asymptotic Secrecy Performance: In this subsection, we
provide valuable insights into the system design by evaluating
the secrecy performance at high SNRs with B ! 1.
Here, B ! 1 corresponds to the scenario where Bob is
located much closer to Alice than Eve. The asymptotic result
allows us to quantify the diversity loss induced by exponential
correlation and outdated antenna selection.
At high SNRs, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
can be expressed as
P1out (Rs) = G (B)
 d
+ o
 
 dB

; (23)
where d denotes the secrecy diversity order and describes how
fast the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing
B , G denotes the secrecy array gain and characterizes the
SNR advantage of the asymptotic outage probability relative
to the reference curve  dB , and o() denotes higher order
terms [18]. We next present the secrecy diversity order and
the secrecy array gain in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy diversity order is derived as
d = NB; (24)
and the secrecy array gain is derived as
G =NA
( 1)NB+1
  (NB + 1)
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n
 X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
( 1)n n!

 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1

' 1i +
PNB
l=1 kl'
 1
l
NB 1

' 1i + (1  2d)
PNB
l=1 kl'
 1
l
NB
 i
'NB+1i
NBX
t=0

NB
t

  (t+NE)2
tRstE
  (NE)(2Rs   1)t NB
: (25)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
Based on (24) we find that the outdated antenna selection
reduces the secrecy diversity order from NANB to NB . We
highlight that it is possible to improve the secrecy diversity
order if a subset of antennas, rather than a single antenna, out
of all antennas at the transmitter are selected [34]. The effec-
tive design required by this improvement will be a potential
extension of this work in future. The asymptotic result also
reveals that the secrecy array gain in high SNRs, indicated by
(25), is detrimentally influenced by antenna correlation and
outdated antenna selection.
C. Special Case 1: Outdated Antenna Selection Only
In this section, we consider the independent fading case to
merely examine the impact of the outdated antenna selection
in the main channel. In this special case, no spatial correlation
exists at NB antennas, which means that the correlation matrix
 = INB . Under this circumstance, the PDF of k is easily
obtained as
fk (x) =
xNB 1
  (NB) 
NB
B
exp

  x
B

; (26)
We denote the accurate instantaneous SNR of the main
channel in this case by B1 . To derive the CDF of B1 , we
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need to resort to the bivariate gamma distribution, which has
been given in [35]
f~k;k (x; y) =
 
xy

2d
NB 1
2
(1  2d)   (NB) NB+1B
exp
   (x+ y)
(1  2d) B

 INB 1

2d
p
xy
(1  2d) B

; (27)
where ~k is the d time-delayed version of k. Using (27), the
CDF of B1 is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The CDF of B1 is derived as
FB1 (x) =
NA
  (NB)
NA 1X
q=0

NA   1
q

( 1)q
(1 + q)
NB
 (NB ; q)
   (nsum +NB)
nsumB
  
1  2d

B
1 + q (1  2d)
!nsum

nsumX
k=0

nsum
k

1
  (k +NB)
 
2d
 
1  2d

1 + q
!k
 

k +NB ;
(1 + q)x
[1 + q (1  2d)] B

; (28)
where nsum = 0, nprod = 1,  (N; q) = 1 if q = 0,
and nsum =
qP
p=1
(np   1), nprod =
qQ
p=1
  (np),  (N; q) =
NP
n1
NP
n2
  
NP
nq
1
nprod
if q  1.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
Substituting (18) and (28) into (20), the exact secrecy outage
probability is derived as
P
(1)
out (Rs) =1 
2RsNA
  (NB)B
NB
NA 1X
q=0
exp
 
(1 + q)
 
1  2Rs
[1 + q (1  2d)] B
!


NA 1
q

 (NB; q)
B
nsum
  
1  2d

B
1 + q (1  2d)
!nsum
   (nsum +NB)
[1 + q (1  2d)]NB
nsumX
k=0

nsum
k

( 1)q
  (k +NB)

 
2d
 
1  2d

B

1 + q (1  2d)
!k k+NB 1X
t=0

k +NB   1
t

  2Rs 1k+NB 1 t 2tRs ("1+q  1 2d
2Rs (1 + q)
# t+1
   (t+ 1) t+1B  
NE 1X
s=0
  (s+ t+ 1)
  (s+ 1)sE


2Rs (1 + q)
1 + q (1  2d)
1
B
+
1
E
 (s+t+1))
:
(29)
To derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
P
(1)1
out (Rs), the first non-zero order expansion of FB1 (),
F1B1 (), is given by
F1B1 () =
NA
  (NB + 1)  (NB)
NA 1X
q=0

NA   1
q

 (NB ; q)
   (nsum +NB)
nsumB
  
1  2d

B
1 + q (1  2d)
!nsum


1 + q
1 + q (1  2d)
NB  
B
NB
+ o

 NBB

:
(30)
Based on these results, the secrecy diversity order and the
secrecy array gain are derived as d1 = NB and
G1 =
NA
  (NB + 1)  (NB)
NA 1X
q=0

NA   1
q

( 1)q
(1 + q)
NB
  (NB; q)   (nsum+NB)
nsumB
  
1  2d

B
1 + q (1  2d)
!nsum


1 + q
1 + q (1  2d)
NB 1
  (NE)
NBX
q=1

NB
q

  2Rs   1NB q 2qRs  (q +NE) qE : (31)
respectively. Comparing d1 with the result in conventional
TAS system [17], we find that the outdated antenna selection
in the main channel reduces the secrecy diversity order from
NANB to NB . In addition, comparing G1 with G in (25), we
find that the antenna correlation at Bob increases the secrecy
array gain at high SNRs and thus reduces the secrecy outage
performance.
D. Special Case 2: Exponential Antenna Correlation Only
In this section, TAS is conducted based on perfect CSI,
while exponential antenna correlation exists among the NB
antennas. We denote the instantaneous SNR of the main
channel in this special case by B2 . We then derive the CDF
of B2 as
FB2 (x) =
 
1 
NBX
u=1
u exp ( ux)
!NA
: (32)
Substituting (18) and (32) into (20), the exact secrecy outage
probability is derived as
P
(2)
out (Rs) =
NAX
n=0

NA
n

( 1)n n!
X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!

exp

 
PNB
i=1 kii
  
2Rs   1h
1 + 2RsE
PNB
i=1 kii
iNE : (33)
To derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
P
(2)1
out (Rs), the first non-zero order expansion of FB2 (),
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Fig. 3. The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity for E = 0 dB.
F1B2 (), is obtained as
F1B2 () =
 
( 1)NB+1
  (NB + 1)
NBX
u=1
u
'NBu
!NA 

B
NANB
+ o

 NANBB

: (34)
Using (34), the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array
gain are derived as d2 = NANB and
G2 =
 
( 1)NB+1
  (NB + 1)
NBX
u=1
u
'NBu
!NA NANBX
q=1

NANB
q

   (q +NE)
  (NE)
2Rsq
 
2Rs   1NANB q qE ; (35)
respectively. Comparing d2 with d in (24), we find that
outdated antenna selection leads to a loss of the secrecy
diversity order. That is, outdated antenna correlation reduces
the transmit diversity from NA to 1. We further confirm that
the antenna correlation among the NB antennas does not affect
the diversity order.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We present numerical results in this section to examine
the secrecy performance of the proposed TAS scheme in the
presence of outdated antenna selection and antenna correlation.
It is evident from Figs. 3 and 4 that the Monte Carlo simulation
points, marked by ‘’, match precisely with the analytical
curves, which demonstrates the accuracy of our analysis.
Fig. 3 plots the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
versus B for different values of a and d. In this figure,
we observe that the exponential correlation at NB anten-
nas is beneficial to the secrecy performance at low SNR,
but detrimental to the secrecy performance at medium and
high SNRs. For example, when B < 0 dB, Pr fCs > 0g
improves when a increases for d = 0:2 and NE = 4.
This observation is not surprising since the spatial correlation
reduces the effective dimensionality at Bob at low B , which
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Fig. 4. The secrecy outage probability for NA = 2, NB = 2, NE = 2, and
Rs = 1.
enables power focusing. Alternatively, when B > 0 dB,
Pr fCs > 0g decreases when a increases for d = 0:2 and
NE = 4. This is due to the fact that at medium and high B ,
higher a indicates the degraded quality of the main channel,
which leads to a poorer secrecy performance. Moreover, we
observe that the outdated antenna selection is detrimental to
the secrecy performance for the whole range of B . For
example, Pr fCs > 0g decreases when d decreases for a fixed
a. This performance loss is caused by the time delay during
the TAS process. Furthermore, we observe that Pr (Cs > 0)
significantly decreases as NE increases. This is due to the fact
that the use of multiple antennas at Eve brings a better quality
of the eavesdropper’s channel.
Fig. 4 plots the secrecy outage probability versus B for
different values of a, d and E . This figure demonstrates
that when B is high, antenna correlation and outdated antenna
selection are detrimental to the secrecy performance. Specif-
ically, Pout (Rs) increases when a increases for a fixed d,
but decreases when d increases for a fixed a. This can be
explained by the fact that at high SNR, a higher a degrades
the benefits of MRC at Bob and a lower d degrades the
benefits of TAS at Alice. In addition, we observe that the
secrecy outage probability increases when Eve moves closer
to Alice (i.e., higher E). This is due to the fact that the shorter
distance between Alice and Eve strengthens the eavesdropper’s
channel quality and thus weakens the secrecy performance.
Fig. 5 plots the exact and asymptotic secrecy outage prob-
ability versus B for different values of a and d. Since
our analytical results have been verified using Monte Carlo
simulations in Figs. 3 and 4, we omit Monte Carlo simulation
points in this figure to avoid unnecessarily cluttering. Note
that G0 and d0 in this figure correspond to the conventional
TAS scheme with perfect CSI but without antenna correlation
[17]. We first observe that our asymptotic curves accurately
predict the secrecy diversity order and the secrecy array gain.
Moreover, we observe that the secrecy diversity order is not
affected by a, but reduced by d, as indicated by d2 = d0 =
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NANB and d = d1 = NB . This observation demonstrates that
outdated antenna selection, rather than antenna correlation at
NB antennas, leads to a loss of the secrecy diversity order.
Furthermore, we observe that for a fixed d, a higher a brings
about a poorer secrecy performance.
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy outage probability versus d for
different values of NA and B . In this figure, we do not
consider the exponential antenna correlation such that a = 0.
We first observe that the secrecy outage probability increases
as d decreases. We also observe that for a fixed B , a higher
NA leads to an improvement in the secrecy performance for
d > 0 but does not bring any improvement for d = 0. These
observations indicate that a lower d reduces the benefits of
TAS in security enhancement and d = 0 corresponds to
the specific scenario where a completely random antenna is
used for secure transmission and TAS does not offer any
benefit. Based on this observation, we conclude that the
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Fig. 7. The secrecy outage probability for d = 1, NB = 2, NE = 4,
E = 0 dB, and Rs = 1.
improvement brought by a higher NA to secrecy performance
is sensitive to d. Furthermore, we observe that for a fixed NA,
a higher B brings a significant improvement in the secrecy
outage probability. Notably, this performance improvement
diminishes when d decreases. Based on this observation, we
conclude that the improvement brought by a higher B to
secrecy performance is also sensitive to d.
Fig. 7 plots the secrecy outage probability versus a for dif-
ferent values of NA and B . In this figure, we consider perfect
TAS such that d = 1. We first observe that Pout (Rs) slightly
decreases as a increases when B = 2 dB. When B = 8 dB,
we observe that Pout (Rs) slightly increases as a increases.
Such an observation is in accordance with the fact that the
antenna correlation is beneficial to the secrecy performance at
low B but detrimental to the secrecy performance at medium
and high B . We also observe that for a fixed B , higher NA
offers a decrease in Pout (Rs). Notably, such a decrease almost
does not change as a increases. Based on this observation,
we conclude that the improvement brought by higher NA to
the secrecy performance is not sensitive to a.
We now show the additional overhead added by our pro-
posed transmission scheme, which is one time slot, is worth-
while. We have clarified that if we adopt the conventional
TAS scheme in the presence of outdated CSI, an outage
event, defined as Eco = fB > ~Bg, occurs in the main
channel. We refer to this outage event as the connection outage
in this paper. This outage event is caused by the fact that
the main channel capacity known at Alice during the TAS
process is higher than the main channel capacity during the
transmission process. To offer more insights into connection
outage, Fig. 8 plots the connection outage probability versus
NA for different values of d. It is evident from this figure
that the connection outage probability is always higher than
0:5, which implies that more than half of the transmitted
information bits cannot be decoded at Bob if the conventional
TAS scheme is adopted. We also note that if the conventional
TAS scheme is used in the presence of outdated CSI, a higher
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NA brings a worse performance. This can be explained by
the fact that a higher NA leads to a higher probability that
B is greater than ~B , due to the characteristics of Gauss-
Markov process. In addition, the connection outage probability
increases when d decreases for a fixed NA. This is not
surprising since a lower d reduces the benefits of TAS. All
the aforementioned observations demonstrate the advantage of
our proposed scheme relative to the conventional TAS scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a new secure transmission scheme that re-
quires two feedback operations in different time slots to avoid
the connection outage in the presence of outdated TAS. Based
on our proposed scheme, we analyzed the secrecy performance
with exponential antenna correlation at the legitimate receiver
in MIMOME wiretap channels. New closed-form expressions
were derived for the exact secrecy outage probability, the
probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability. Importantly, our asymptotic ex-
pressions demonstrated that the outdated TAS reduces the
secrecy diversity order from NANB to NB . Moreover, we
demonstrated that at low B , higher antenna correlation brings
a better secrecy performance, but at medium and high B ,
higher antenna correlation brings a worse secrecy perfor-
mance. We further demonstrated that the secrecy performance
improvement bought by increasing NA is sensitive to d but
not sensitive to a.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since ~k and k are correlated generalized hyper-
exponential distributed RVs, we use [36, Eq. (16)] to rewrite
them as
~k =
NBX
i=1
'i~i;k (36)
and
k =
NBX
i=1
'ii;k; (37)
respectively, where ~i;k and i;k are exponentially distributed
with E [~i;k] = E [i;k] = B . The correlation coefficient
between ~i;k and i;k is given by
2d =
E [~i;k  i;k]  E [~i;k]E [i;k]
~i;ki;k
; (38)
where ~i;k and i;k are the variances of ~i;k and i;k,
respectively.
We note that the two dimensional MGF of the bivariate
generalized hyper-exponential distribution is defined as
 ~k;k (s1; s2)
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
f~k;k (x; y) exp ( s1x  s2y) dxdy: (39)
Recall that the joint MGF of two correlated Gamma distributed
RVs is given by [37]
 X;Y (s1; s2) =
0BB@ 1  2d
1+ s1/m
(1 2d)
 1
 
1+ s2/m
(1 2d)
 1

  2d
1CCA
m
;
(40)
where X =
Pm
i=1 xi and Y =
Pm
i=1 yi, xi and yi are
exponentially distributed with E [xi] = E [yi] = /m, and
d is the correlation coefficient between xi and yi. With the
aid of (40),  ~k;k (s1; s2) is written as
 ~k;k (s1; s2) =
NBY
u=1
1  2d
1+ s1'uB
(1 2d)
 1
 
1+ s2'uB
(1 2d)
 1

  2d
:
(41)
Using partial fraction,  ~k;k (s1; s2) can be further expressed
as
 ~k;k (s1; s2) =
NBX
u=1
u
1  2d
1+ s1'uB
(1 2d)
 1
 
1+ s2'uB
(1 2d)
 1

  2d
:
(42)
Inverting  ~k;k (s1; s2) with respect to s1 and s2 successively,
we obtain the joint PDF of ~k and k as
f~k;k (x; y)=
NBX
u=1
u
(1  2d) ('uB)2
exp

  x+ y
(1  2d)'uB

 I0

2d
p
xy
(1  2d)'uB

: (43)
Setting u = ('uB)
 1, we obtain the desired result in (12).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Substituting (13) and (15) into (14), we express f~B (x) as
f~B (x) = NA
Z 1
0
f~k;k (x; y) [Fk (y)]
NA 1 dy: (44)
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Using the generalized multinomial theorem given byX
xi
n
=
X
P
ki=n
n!Q
ki!
Y
xkii ; (45)
we express [Fk (y)]
NA 1 as
[Fk (y)]
NA 1=
NA 1X
n=0

NA 1
n

( 1)n
X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
n!

 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
exp

 y
XNB
i=1
kii

: (46)
We then use [33, Eq. (6.614.3)] to obtain the desired result in
(16).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The asymptotic outage probability can be derived by using
the method in [18]. We first apply Taylor’s series to derive
first nonzero order expansion F1~B ()
F1~B () =
NA ( 1)NB+1
  (NB + 1)
NA 1X
n=0

NA   1
n

( 1)nn!

X
PNB
i=1 ki=n
 
NBY
i=1
kii
ki!
!
NBX
i=1
i
'NB+1i


' 1i +
PNB
l=1 kl'
 1
l
NB 1

' 1i + (1  2d)
PNB
l=1 kl'
 1
l
NB



B
NB
+ o

 NBB

: (47)
Substituting (18) and (47) into (20) and using [33, Eq.
(3.381.1)] to solve the resultant integrals, we obtain the
expressions for d in (24) and G in (25).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Substituting (27) and (50) into (44), we obtain the PDF of
B1 as
fB1 (x) =
NA
(1  2d)   (NB)(B)NB+1
exp

  x
(1  2d) B



x
2d
NB 1
2
NA 1X
q=0

NA   1
q

( 1)q  (NB ; q)
nsumB

Z +1
0
ynsum+
NB 1
2 exp
 
 y + yq
 
1  2d

(1  2d)B
!
 INB 1

2d
p
xy
(1  2d) B

dy: (48)
Using [33, Eq. (6.643.2)], [33, Eq. (9.220.2)], and [38], we
obtain the following useful formulae asZ +1
0
x 1=2 exp ( x) I2v
 
2
p
x

dx
=  (+ v + 1=2) (+1=2) exp
 
2=


 v 1=2X
k=0

  v   1=2
k
  
2=
v+k
  (k + 2v + 1)
: (49)
Using (49) to solve the integral in (48), the PDF of B1 is
derived as
fB1 (x) =
NAx
NB 1
  (NB) 
NB
B
exp
  x
(1  2d) B
NA 1X
q=0
( 1)q


NA   1
q

exp
 
2dx
 
1  2d

[1 + q (1  2d)] B
!
  (NB ; q)
[1 + q (1  2d)]NB
  
1  2d

B
1 + q (1  2d)
!nsum

nsumX
k=0

nsum
k
 
2dx
 
1  2d

[1 + q (1  2d)] B
!k
   (nsum +NB)
nsumB   (k +NB)
: (50)
Applying [33, Eq. (3.381.8)] we obtain FB1 (x) in (28).
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